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// Copyright Materialize, Inc. and contributors. All rights reserved.
//
// Use of this software is governed by the Business Source License
// included in the LICENSE file.
//
// As of the Change Date specified in that file, in accordance with
// the Business Source License, use of this software will be governed
// by the Apache License, Version 2.0.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::future::Future;
use std::num::NonZeroUsize;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use anyhow::Context as _;
use derivative::Derivative;
use futures::future::Shared;
use futures::FutureExt;
use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, Validation};
use lru::LruCache;
use mz_ore::instrument;
use mz_ore::metrics::MetricsRegistry;
use mz_ore::now::NowFn;
use mz_ore::time::DurationExt;
use mz_repr::user::ExternalUserMetadata;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tokio::sync::watch;
use tokio::time;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::metrics::Metrics;
use crate::{ApiTokenArgs, AppPassword, Client, Error, FronteggCliArgs};
/// SAFETY: Value is known to be non-zero.
pub const DEFAULT_REFRESH_DROP_LRU_CACHE_SIZE: NonZeroUsize =
unsafe { NonZeroUsize::new_unchecked(1024) };
/// If a session is dropped within [`DEFAULT_REFRESH_DROP_FACTOR`] `* valid_for` seconds of an
/// authentication token expiring, then we'll continue to refresh the auth token, with the
/// assumption that a new instance of this session will be started soon.
pub const DEFAULT_REFRESH_DROP_FACTOR: f64 = 0.05;
/// The maximum length of a user name.
pub const MAX_USER_NAME_LENGTH: usize = 255;
/// Configures an [`Authenticator`].
#[derive(Clone, Derivative)]
#[derivative(Debug)]
pub struct AuthenticatorConfig {
/// URL for the token endpoint, including full path.
pub admin_api_token_url: String,
/// JWK used to validate JWTs.
#[derivative(Debug = "ignore")]
pub decoding_key: DecodingKey,
/// Optional tenant id used to validate JWTs.
pub tenant_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// Function to provide system time to validate exp (expires at) field of JWTs.
pub now: NowFn,
/// Name of admin role.
pub admin_role: String,
/// How many [`AppPassword`]s we'll track the last dropped time for.
///
/// TODO(parkmycar): Wire this up to LaunchDarkly.
pub refresh_drop_lru_size: NonZeroUsize,
/// How large of a window we'll use for determining if a session was dropped "recently", and if
/// we should refresh the session, even if there are not any active handles to it.
///
/// TODO(parkmycar): Wire this up to LaunchDarkly.
pub refresh_drop_factor: f64,
}
/// Facilitates authenticating users via Frontegg, and verifying returned JWTs.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Authenticator {
inner: Arc<AuthenticatorInner>,
}
impl Authenticator {
/// Creates a new authenticator.
pub fn new(config: AuthenticatorConfig, client: Client, registry: &MetricsRegistry) -> Self {
let mut validation = Validation::new(Algorithm::RS256);
// We validate the token expiration with our own now function.
validation.validate_exp = false;
// We don't validate the audience because:
//
// 1. We don't have easy access to the expected audience ID here.
//
// 2. There is no meaningful security improvement to doing so, because
// Frontegg always sets the audience to the ID of the workspace
// that issued the token. Since we only trust the signing keys from
// a single Frontegg workspace, the audience is redundant.
//
// See this conversation [0] from the Materialize–Frontegg shared Slack
// channel on 1 January 2024.
//
// [0]: https://materializeinc.slack.com/archives/C02940WNMRQ/p1704131331041669
validation.validate_aud = false;
let metrics = Metrics::register_into(registry);
let active_sessions = Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new());
let dropped_sessions = Mutex::new(LruCache::new(config.refresh_drop_lru_size));
Authenticator {
inner: Arc::new(AuthenticatorInner {
admin_api_token_url: config.admin_api_token_url,
client,
validation,
decoding_key: config.decoding_key,
tenant_id: config.tenant_id,
admin_role: config.admin_role,
now: config.now,
active_sessions,
dropped_sessions,
refresh_drop_factor: config.refresh_drop_factor,
metrics,
}),
}
}
/// Create an [`Authenticator`] from [`FronteggCliArgs`].
pub fn from_args(
args: FronteggCliArgs,
registry: &MetricsRegistry,
) -> Result<Option<Self>, Error> {
let config = match (
args.frontegg_tenant,
args.frontegg_api_token_url,
args.frontegg_admin_role,
) {
(None, None, None) => {
return Ok(None);
}
(Some(tenant_id), Some(admin_api_token_url), Some(admin_role)) => {
let decoding_key = match (args.frontegg_jwk, args.frontegg_jwk_file) {
(None, Some(path)) => {
let jwk = std::fs::read(&path)
.with_context(|| format!("reading {path:?} for --frontegg-jwk-file"))?;
DecodingKey::from_rsa_pem(&jwk)?
}
(Some(jwk), None) => DecodingKey::from_rsa_pem(jwk.as_bytes())?,
_ => {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
"expected exactly one of --frontegg-jwk or --frontegg-jwk-file"
)
.into())
}
};
AuthenticatorConfig {
admin_api_token_url,
decoding_key,
tenant_id: Some(tenant_id),
now: mz_ore::now::SYSTEM_TIME.clone(),
admin_role,
refresh_drop_lru_size: DEFAULT_REFRESH_DROP_LRU_CACHE_SIZE,
refresh_drop_factor: DEFAULT_REFRESH_DROP_FACTOR,
}
}
_ => unreachable!("clap enforced"),
};
let client = Client::environmentd_default();
Ok(Some(Self::new(config, client, registry)))
}
/// Establishes a new authentication session.
///
/// If successful, returns a handle to the authentication session.
/// Otherwise, returns the authentication error.
pub async fn authenticate(
&self,
expected_user: &str,
password: &str,
) -> Result<AuthSessionHandle, Error> {
let password: AppPassword = password.parse()?;
match self.authenticate_inner(expected_user, password).await {
Ok(handle) => {
tracing::debug!("authentication successful");
Ok(handle)
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::debug!(error = ?e, "authentication failed");
Err(e)
}
}
}
#[instrument(level = "debug", fields(client_id = %password.client_id))]
async fn authenticate_inner(
&self,
expected_user: &str,
password: AppPassword,
) -> Result<AuthSessionHandle, Error> {
let request = {
let mut sessions = self.inner.active_sessions.lock().expect("lock poisoned");
match sessions.get_mut(&password) {
// We have an existing session for this app password.
Some(AuthSession::Active {
ident,
external_metadata_tx,
..
}) => {
tracing::debug!(?password.client_id, "joining active session");
validate_user(&ident.user, expected_user)?;
self.inner
.metrics
.session_request_count
.with_label_values(&["active"])
.inc();
// Return a handle to the existing session.
return Ok(AuthSessionHandle {
ident: Arc::clone(ident),
external_metadata_rx: external_metadata_tx.subscribe(),
authenticator: Arc::clone(&self.inner),
app_password: password,
});
}
// We have an in flight request to establish a session.
Some(AuthSession::Pending(request)) => {
// Latch on to the existing session.
tracing::debug!(?password.client_id, "joining pending session");
self.inner
.metrics
.session_request_count
.with_label_values(&["pending"])
.inc();
request.clone()
}
// We do not have an existing session for this API key.
None => {
tracing::debug!(?password.client_id, "starting new session");
// Prepare the request to create a new session.
let request: Pin<Box<AuthFuture>> = Box::pin({
let inner = Arc::clone(&self.inner);
let expected_user = String::from(expected_user);
async move {
let result = inner.authenticate(expected_user, password).await;
// Make sure our AuthSession state is correct.
//
// Note: We're quite defensive here because this has been a source of
// bugs in the past.
let mut sessions = inner.active_sessions.lock().expect("lock poisoned");
if let Err(err) = &result {
let session = sessions.remove(&password);
tracing::debug!(?err, ?session, "removing failed auth session");
} else {
// If the request succeeds, make sure our state is what we expect.
match sessions.get(&password) {
// Expected State.
Some(AuthSession::Active { .. }) => (),
// Invalid! The AuthSession should have become Active.
None | Some(AuthSession::Pending(_)) => {
tracing::error!(
?password.client_id,
"failed to make auth session active!"
);
sessions.remove(&password);
}
}
}
result
}
});
// Store the future so that future requests can latch on.
let request = request.shared();
sessions.insert(password, AuthSession::Pending(request.clone()));
self.inner
.metrics
.session_request_count
.with_label_values(&["new"])
.inc();
// Make sure there is always something driving the request to completion
// incase the client goes away.
mz_ore::task::spawn(|| "auth-session-listener", {
let request = request.clone();
async move {
// We don't care about the result here, someone else handles it.
let _ = request.await;
}
});
// Wait for the request to complete.
request
}
}
};
request.await
}
/// Validates an access token, returning the validated claims.
///
/// The following validations are always performed:
///
/// * The token is not expired, according to the `Authentication`'s clock.
///
/// * The tenant ID in the token matches the `Authentication`'s tenant ID.
///
/// If `expected_user` is provided, the token's user name is additionally
/// validated to match `expected_user`.
pub fn validate_access_token(
&self,
token: &str,
expected_user: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<ValidatedClaims, Error> {
self.inner.validate_access_token(token, expected_user)
}
}
/// A handle to an authentication session.
///
/// An authentication session represents a duration of time during which a
/// user's authentication is known to be valid.
///
/// An authentication session begins with a successful API key exchange with
/// Frontegg. While there is at least one outstanding handle to the session, the
/// session's metadata and validity are refreshed with Frontegg at a regular
/// interval. The session ends when all outstanding handles are dropped and the
/// refresh interval is reached.
///
/// [`AuthSessionHandle::external_metadata_rx`] can be used to receive events if
/// the session's metadata is updated.
///
/// [`AuthSessionHandle::expired`] can be used to learn if the session has
/// failed to refresh the validity of the API key.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthSessionHandle {
ident: Arc<AuthSessionIdent>,
external_metadata_rx: watch::Receiver<ExternalUserMetadata>,
/// Hold a handle to the [`AuthenticatorInner`] so we can record when this session was dropped.
authenticator: Arc<AuthenticatorInner>,
/// Used to record when the session linked with this [`AppPassword`] was dropped.
app_password: AppPassword,
}
impl AuthSessionHandle {
/// Returns the name of the user that created the session.
pub fn user(&self) -> &str {
&self.ident.user
}
/// Returns the ID of the tenant that created the session.
pub fn tenant_id(&self) -> Uuid {
self.ident.tenant_id
}
/// Mints a receiver for updates to the session user's external metadata.
pub fn external_metadata_rx(&self) -> watch::Receiver<ExternalUserMetadata> {
self.external_metadata_rx.clone()
}
/// Completes when the authentication session has expired.
pub async fn expired(&mut self) {
// We piggyback on the external metadata channel to determine session
// expiration. The external metadata channel is closed when the session
// expires.
let _ = self.external_metadata_rx.wait_for(|_| false).await;
}
}
impl Drop for AuthSessionHandle {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.authenticator.record_dropped_session(self.app_password);
}
}
#[derive(Derivative)]
#[derivative(Debug)]
struct AuthenticatorInner {
/// Frontegg API fields.
admin_api_token_url: String,
client: Client,
/// JWT decoding and validation fields.
validation: Validation,
#[derivative(Debug = "ignore")]
decoding_key: DecodingKey,
tenant_id: Option<Uuid>,
admin_role: String,
now: NowFn,
/// Session tracking.
active_sessions: Mutex<BTreeMap<AppPassword, AuthSession>>,
/// Most recent time at which a session created with an [`AppPassword`] was dropped.
///
/// We track when a session was dropped to handle the case of many one-shot queries being
/// issued in rapid succession. If it comes time to refresh an auth token, and there are no
/// currently alive sessions, but one was recently dropped, we'll pre-emptively refresh to get
/// ahead of another session being created with the same [`AppPassword`].
dropped_sessions: Mutex<LruCache<AppPassword, Instant>>,
/// How large of a window we'll use for determining if a session was dropped "recently", and if
/// we should refresh the session, even if there are not any active handles to it.
refresh_drop_factor: f64,
/// Metrics.
metrics: Metrics,
}
impl AuthenticatorInner {
async fn authenticate(
self: &Arc<Self>,
expected_user: String,
password: AppPassword,
) -> Result<AuthSessionHandle, Error> {
// Attempt initial app password exchange.
let mut claims = self.exchange_app_password(&expected_user, password).await?;
// Prep session information.
let ident = Arc::new(AuthSessionIdent {
user: claims.user.clone(),
tenant_id: claims.tenant_id,
});
let external_metadata = claims.to_external_user_metadata();
let (external_metadata_tx, external_metadata_rx) = watch::channel(external_metadata);
let external_metadata_tx = Arc::new(external_metadata_tx);
// Store session to make it available for future requests to latch on
// to.
{
let mut sessions = self.active_sessions.lock().expect("lock poisoned");
sessions.insert(
password,
AuthSession::Active {
ident: Arc::clone(&ident),
external_metadata_tx: Arc::clone(&external_metadata_tx),
},
);
}
// Start background refresh task.
let name = format!("frontegg-auth-refresh-{}", password.client_id);
mz_ore::task::spawn(|| name, {
let inner = Arc::clone(self);
async move {
tracing::debug!(?password.client_id, "starting refresh task");
let gauge = inner.metrics.refresh_tasks_active.with_label_values(&[]);
gauge.inc();
loop {
let valid_for = Duration::try_from_secs_i64(claims.exp - inner.now.as_secs())
.unwrap_or(Duration::from_secs(60));
// If we have no outstanding handling to this session, but a handle was dropped
// within this window, then we'll still refresh.
let drop_window = valid_for
.saturating_mul_f64(inner.refresh_drop_factor)
.max(Duration::from_secs(1));
// Scale the validity duration by 0.8. The Frontegg Python
// SDK scales the expires_in this way.
//
// <https://github.com/frontegg/python-sdk/blob/840f8318aced35cea6a41d83270597edfceb4019/frontegg/common/frontegg_authenticator.py#L45>
let valid_for = valid_for.saturating_mul_f64(0.8);
if valid_for < Duration::from_secs(60) {
tracing::warn!(?valid_for, "unexpectedly low token validity");
}
tracing::debug!(
?valid_for,
?drop_window,
"waiting for token validity period"
);
// Wait out validity duration.
time::sleep(valid_for).await;
// Check to see if all external metadata receivers have gone away, or if a
// session created with this password was recently dropped. If no one is
// listening nor any recent handles were dropped we can clean up the session.
let receiver_count = external_metadata_tx.receiver_count();
let last_drop = inner.last_dropped_session(&password);
let recent_drop = last_drop
.map(|dropped_at| dropped_at.elapsed() <= drop_window)
.unwrap_or(false);
if receiver_count == 0 && !recent_drop {
tracing::debug!(
?last_drop,
?password.client_id,
"all listeners have dropped and none of them were recent!"
);
break;
}
let outstanding_receivers = bool_as_str(receiver_count > 0);
inner
.metrics
.session_refresh_count
.with_label_values(&[outstanding_receivers, bool_as_str(recent_drop)])
.inc();
tracing::debug!(
receiver_count,
?last_drop,
?password.client_id,
"refreshing due to interest in the session"
);
// We still have interest, attempt to refresh the session.
let res = inner.exchange_app_password(&expected_user, password).await;
claims = match res {
Ok(claims) => {
tracing::debug!("refresh successful");
claims
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "refresh failed");
break;
}
};
external_metadata_tx.send_replace(ExternalUserMetadata {
admin: claims.is_admin,
user_id: claims.user_id,
});
}
// The session has expired. Clean up the state.
{
let mut sessions = inner.active_sessions.lock().expect("lock poisoned");
sessions.remove(&password);
}
{
let mut dropped_session = inner.dropped_sessions.lock().expect("lock poisoned");
dropped_session.pop(&password);
}
tracing::debug!(?password.client_id, "shutting down refresh task");
gauge.dec();
}
});
// Return handle to session.
Ok(AuthSessionHandle {
ident,
external_metadata_rx,
authenticator: Arc::clone(self),
app_password: password,
})
}
#[instrument]
async fn exchange_app_password(
&self,
expected_user: &str,
password: AppPassword,
) -> Result<ValidatedClaims, Error> {
let req = ApiTokenArgs {
client_id: password.client_id,
secret: password.secret_key,
};
let res = self
.client
.exchange_client_secret_for_token(req, &self.admin_api_token_url, &self.metrics)
.await?;
self.validate_access_token(&res.access_token, Some(expected_user))
}
fn validate_access_token(
&self,
token: &str,
expected_user: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<ValidatedClaims, Error> {
let msg = jsonwebtoken::decode::<Claims>(token, &self.decoding_key, &self.validation)?;
if msg.claims.exp < self.now.as_secs() {
return Err(Error::TokenExpired);
}
if let Some(expected_tenant_id) = self.tenant_id {
if msg.claims.tenant_id != expected_tenant_id {
return Err(Error::UnauthorizedTenant);
}
}
let user = msg.claims.user()?;
if let Some(expected_user) = expected_user {
validate_user(user, expected_user)?;
}
Ok(ValidatedClaims {
exp: msg.claims.exp,
user: user.to_string(),
user_id: msg.claims.user_id()?,
tenant_id: msg.claims.tenant_id,
// The user is an administrator if they have the admin role that the
// `Authenticator` has been configured with.
is_admin: msg.claims.roles.iter().any(|r| *r == self.admin_role),
_private: (),
})
}
/// Records an [`AuthSessionHandle`] that was recently dropped.
fn record_dropped_session(&self, app_password: AppPassword) {
let now = Instant::now();
let Ok(mut dropped_sessions) = self.dropped_sessions.lock() else {
return;
};
dropped_sessions.push(app_password, now);
}
/// Returns the instant that an [`AuthSessionHandle`] created with the provided [`AppPassword`]
/// was last dropped.
fn last_dropped_session(&self, app_password: &AppPassword) -> Option<Instant> {
let Ok(dropped_sessions) = self.dropped_sessions.lock() else {
return None;
};
dropped_sessions.peek(app_password).copied()
}
}
type AuthFuture = dyn Future<Output = Result<AuthSessionHandle, Error>> + Send;
#[derive(Derivative)]
#[derivative(Debug)]
enum AuthSession {
Pending(Shared<Pin<Box<AuthFuture>>>),
Active {
ident: Arc<AuthSessionIdent>,
external_metadata_tx: Arc<watch::Sender<ExternalUserMetadata>>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct AuthSessionIdent {
user: String,
tenant_id: Uuid,
}
/// The type of a JWT issued by Frontegg.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub enum ClaimTokenType {
/// A user token.
///
/// This type of token is issued when logging in via username and password
/// This does *not* include app passwords--those are API tokens under the
/// hood. This type of token is typically only used by the Materialize
/// console, as it requires SSO.
UserToken,
/// A user API token.
UserApiToken,
/// A tenant API token.
TenantApiToken,
}
/// Metadata embedded in a Frontegg JWT.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct ClaimMetadata {
/// The user name to use, for tokens of type `TenantApiToken`.
pub user: Option<String>,
}
/// The raw claims encoded in a Frontegg access token.
///
/// Consult the JSON Web Token specification and the Frontegg documentation to
/// determine the precise semantics of these fields.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct Claims {
/// The "subject" of the token.
///
/// For tokens of type `UserToken`, this is the ID of the Frontegg user
/// itself. For tokens of type `UserApiToken` and `TenantApiToken`, this
/// is the client ID of the API token.
pub sub: Uuid,
/// The time at which the claims expire, represented in seconds since the
/// Unix epoch.
pub exp: i64,
/// The "issuer" of the token.
///
/// This is always the domain associated with the Frontegg workspace.
pub iss: String,
/// The type of API token.
#[serde(rename = "type")]
pub token_type: ClaimTokenType,
/// For tokens of type `UserToken` and `UserApiToken`, the email address
/// of the authenticated user.
pub email: Option<String>,
/// For tokens of type `UserApiToken`, the ID of the authenticated user.
pub user_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// The ID of the authenticated tenant.
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
/// The IDs of the roles granted by the token.
pub roles: Vec<String>,
/// The IDs of the permissions granted by the token.
pub permissions: Vec<String>,
/// Metadata embedded in the JWT.
pub metadata: Option<ClaimMetadata>,
}
impl Claims {
/// Returns the name of the user associated with the token.
pub fn user(&self) -> Result<&str, Error> {
match self.token_type {
// Use the email as the username for user tokens.
ClaimTokenType::UserToken | ClaimTokenType::UserApiToken => {
self.email.as_deref().ok_or(Error::MissingClaims)
}
// The user associated with a tenant API token is configured when
// the token is created and passed in the `metadata.user` claim.
ClaimTokenType::TenantApiToken => {
let user = self
.metadata
.as_ref()
.and_then(|m| m.user.as_deref())
.ok_or(Error::MissingClaims)?;
if is_email(user) {
return Err(Error::InvalidTenantApiTokenUser);
}
Ok(user)
}
}
}
/// Returns the ID of the user associated with the token.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> Result<Uuid, Error> {
match self.token_type {
// The `sub` claim stores the ID of the user.
ClaimTokenType::UserToken => Ok(self.sub),
// Unlike user tokens, the `sub` claim stores the client ID of the
// API token. The user ID is passed in the dedicated `user_id`
// claim.
ClaimTokenType::UserApiToken => self.user_id.ok_or(Error::MissingClaims),
// The best user ID for a tenant API token is the client ID of the
// tenant API token, as the tokens are not associated with a
// Frontegg user.
ClaimTokenType::TenantApiToken => Ok(self.sub),
}
}
}
/// [`Claims`] that have been validated by
/// [`Authenticator::validate_access_token`].
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ValidatedClaims {
/// The time at which the claims expire, represented in seconds since the
/// Unix epoch.
pub exp: i64,
/// The ID of the authenticated user.
pub user_id: Uuid,
/// The name of the authenticated user.
///
/// For tokens of type `UserToken` or `UserApiToken`, this is the email
/// address of the authenticated user. For tokens of type `TenantApiToken`,
/// this is the `serviceUser` field in the token's metadata.
pub user: String,
/// The ID of the tenant the user is authenticated for.
pub tenant_id: Uuid,
/// Whether the authenticated user is an administrator.
pub is_admin: bool,
// Prevent construction outside of `Authenticator::validate_access_token`.
_private: (),
}
impl ValidatedClaims {
/// Constructs an [`ExternalUserMetadata`] from the claims data.
fn to_external_user_metadata(&self) -> ExternalUserMetadata {
ExternalUserMetadata {
admin: self.is_admin,
user_id: self.user_id,
}
}
}
/// Reports whether a username is an email address.
fn is_email(user: &str) -> bool {
// We don't need a sophisticated test here. We need a test that will return
// `true` for anything that can possibly be an email address, while also
// returning `false` for a large class of strings that can be used as names
// for service users.
//
// Checking for `@` balances the concerns. Every email address MUST have an
// `@` character. Disallowing `@` characters in service user names is an
// acceptable restriction.
user.contains('@')
}
fn validate_user(user: &str, expected_user: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Impose a maximum length on user names for sanity.
if user.len() > MAX_USER_NAME_LENGTH {
return Err(Error::UserNameTooLong);
}
let valid = match is_email(expected_user) {
false => user == expected_user,
// To match Frontegg, email addresses are compared case insensitively.
//
// NOTE(benesch): we could save some allocations by using `unicase::eq`
// here, but the `unicase` crate has had some critical correctness bugs that
// make it scary to use in such security-sensitive code.
//
// See: https://github.com/seanmonstar/unicase/pull/39
true => user.to_lowercase() == expected_user.to_lowercase(),
};
match valid {
false => Err(Error::WrongUser),
true => Ok(()),
}
}
const fn bool_as_str(x: bool) -> &'static str {
if x {
"true"
} else {
"false"
}
}